Professor Fish—Why Are You Still Picking on Liberalism? by Schwartzman, Micah
FIU Law Review 
Volume 14 
Number 4 Symposium: The First – Florida 




Professor Fish—Why Are You Still Picking on Liberalism? 
Micah Schwartzman 
University of Virginia School of Law, schwartzman@law.virginia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law 
Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Micah Schwartzman, Professor Fish—Why Are You Still Picking on Liberalism?, 14 FIU L. Rev. 721 (2021). 
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.14.4.9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU 
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
5 - SCHWARTZMAN (2) (DO NOT DELETE)  3/22/2021 10:45 AM 
 
PROFESSOR FISH — WHY ARE YOU STILL PICKING ON 
LIBERALISM? 
Micah Schwartzman* 
I.   Introduction .................................................................................... 721 
II.   How Religion Is(n’t) Special ......................................................... 723 
III.   Normative Reticence (or Nonchalance?) ....................................... 727 
IV.   Answering the Question ................................................................. 729 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Liberalism has always had its critics and its discontents, but never more 
than when there is an upswing of authoritarianism, populism, xenophobia, or 
worse. It’s in these moments—and we seem to be in the midst of one—when 
radicals, especially but not exclusively on the right, emerge to tear down 
liberal principles and liberal institutions. And so now we have Adrian 
Vermeule, at Harvard Law School, who rejects liberalism in favor of Catholic 
integralism,1 which is the idea that church—and to be precise, the Church—
and state ought to be integrated in the pursuit of religious truth.2 And we have 
Steven Smith, who claims, following T.S. Eliot,3 that our culture wars are 
best diagnosed as a conflict between traditional Christians and pagans (aka 
secular liberals).4 And Patrick Deneen has made a splash with his book, Why 
 
* Hardy Cross Dillard Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. This symposium 
contribution is a lightly edited version of remarks delivered at a conference hosted by the Floersheimer 
Center at the Cardozo School of Law on “Hate Speech, Fake News, and Post-Truth in the Age of Trump,” 
celebrating the publication of Professor Fish’s book. 
1 See Adrian Vermeule, All Human Conflict Is Ultimately Theological, CHURCH LIFE J. (July 26, 
2019), https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/all-human-conflict-is-ultimately-theological; Adrian 
Vermeule, Integration from Within, AM. AFFS. (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/integration-from-within/; Adrian Vermeule, A Christian 
Strategy, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy. 
For an overview of Catholic integralism and criticism of its main ideas, see Micah Schwartzman & Jocelyn 
Wilson, The Unreasonableness of Catholic Integralism, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2019). 
2 See Edmund Waldstein, An Integralist Manifesto, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/10/an-integralist-manifesto; Thomas Pink, In Defence of 
Catholic Integralism, PUB. DISCOURSE (Aug. 12, 2018), 
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/08/39362.  
3 T. S. ELIOT, CHRISTIANITY & CULTURE: THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY AND NOTES 
TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 6 (1948).   
4 STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS & CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE TIBER TO 
THE POTOMAC (2018).  But cf. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and 
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Liberalism Failed.5 And in case you think all this is academic, while serving 
as President Trump’s attorney general. William Barr gave a speech at Notre 
Dame, in which he described a political and cultural war between traditional 
Christians and “militant secularists,” who seek to destroy religion and 
religious freedom.6 
In these times, criticizing liberalism isn’t contrarian. And unless you are 
plumping for a Polish or Hungarian-style ethnoreligious nationalist state,7 
you don’t count as edgy either. Anything less is “David French-ism”8—a 
rather bland form of Becket-Fund-style religious libertarianism.9 
If you have been criticizing liberalism for the last twenty-some years, 
you are now at risk of being outflanked by “hard” antiliberals.10 In his book, 
The First, Professor Stanley Fish describes liberalism as a religion.11 But that 
is just the beginning for contemporary antiliberals. They aren’t interested in 
quibbling with liberalism, in revealing its internal contradictions, or in 
unmasking or deconstructing its claims to neutrality. That is all merely a 
ground-clearing operation. The real work for antiliberals is to promote 
illiberal, perfectionist institutions, which will use the coercive power of the 
 
the First Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1341, 1363–68 (2020) (criticizing antiliberal critics’ use of the 
concept of “modern paganism”) [hereinafter Schragger & Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the 
First Amendment]; Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
497, 505–09 (2019) (criticizing Smith’s reliance on T.S. Eliot’s diagnosis of cultural conflict).  
5 See generally PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018).  
6 William P. Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics 
and Culture at the University of Notre Dame (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-law-school-and-
de-nicola-center-ethics (“[M]ilitant secularists today do not have a live and let live spirit - they are not 
content to leave religious people alone to practice their faith. Instead, they seem to take a delight in 
compelling people to violate their conscience.”). 
7 See Schragger & Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the First Amendment, supra note 
4, at 1357–58, 1426 (discussing antiliberalism in Poland and Hungary). 
8 Sohrab Ahmari, Against David French-ism, FIRST THINGS (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/05/against-david-french-ism.  
9 Cf. Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1053–56 (“The Ahmari-French debate has exposed 
a rift between American religious conservatives. While some remain committed to the framework of 
liberal democratic politics, others are willing to embrace a ‘post-liberal’ or integralist view . . . .”). 
10 See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 88 (1993) (distinguishing between 
“[h]ard antiliberals [who] damn liberalism from a wholly nonliberal point of view, and “[s]oft antiliberals 
[who] malign liberalism verbally, but when faced with practical choices, reveal a surprising fondness for 
liberal protections and freedoms”); see also Schragger & Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the 
First Amendment, supra note 4, at 1356–59 (discussing the “antiliberal revival” and describing various 
antiliberal theories).  
11 STANLEY FISH, THE FIRST: HOW TO THINK ABOUT HATE SPEECH, CAMPUS SPEECH, RELIGIOUS 
SPEECH, FAKE NEWS, POST-TRUTH, AND DONALD TRUMP 147 (2019) (“It is tempting to describe the 
struggle [between transcendent religion and liberalism] as one between technological fiat and rational 
common sense . . . but it would be more accurate to frame it as a struggle between different theologies.”).  
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state to promote the (religious) good, without any fuss or embarrassment 
about respecting liberal rights and principles.12  
When I first read Professor Fish’s earlier book, The Trouble with 
Principle,13 it was against the backdrop of debates about liberal neutrality. 
John Rawls had published Political Liberalism several years earlier,14 and 
looking across both politics and philosophy, one could say that a certain kind 
of liberalism was either well ensconced or perhaps ascendant. But now the 
ground has shifted, and with the rise of antiliberalism, both at home and 
abroad, the objections that liberalism is incoherent, that it has no principle, 
that it is politics all the way down, that there are no right, or fair, or just 
answers—all these claims resonate rather differently. Now that there are both 
philosophical and institutional alternatives to liberalism on offer, it is not 
enough to show off liberalism’s defects, its conceptual warts, or even its 
deeper flaws, conceits, and fictions. In this antiliberal moment, we have to 
ask the practical question: given what we care about—or, let me make this 
personal: given what I care about—is there some better way of doing things? 
Is there another way to think about free speech, or freedom of religion, that 
does better than liberalism? There certainly are proposals out there. And for 
all the critical attention that we have paid to liberalism, perhaps it is time to 
subject competing views to similar levels of scrutiny.15  
In the rest of my comments, which are set against the background of 
antiliberalism’s re-emergence, I focus on Professor Fish’s discussion of 
religious freedom in The First. I argue that he does not pay sufficient 
attention to recent changes—some might say transformations—in the special 
treatment of religion under the First Amendment. I then criticize his reticence 
to take sides in specific debates about religious free exercise. And I conclude 
by offering a speculative answer, however unlikely or surprising, to the 
question that I have posed in the title of these remarks.  
II.  HOW RELIGION IS(N’T) SPECIAL  
An important theme—perhaps even the central argument—of The First 
is that there are no liberal principles that help to make sense of the First 
 
12 See Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1061–66 (discussing integralism’s rejection of the 
liberal values of freedom, equality, and fair social cooperation); Schragger & Schwartzman, Religious 
Antiliberalism and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 1425 (discussing antiliberals’ support for a 
politics of religious perfectionism).  
13 See generally STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999). 
14 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
15 For some initial efforts in this direction, see Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1061–66; 
Schragger & Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the First Amendment, supra note 4, 1356–81; 
see also CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 15–41 (2017).  
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Amendment. In Chapter 4 of the book, Professor Fish makes the provocative 
claim that “the Religion Clause of the First Amendment Doesn’t Belong in 
the Constitution.” The reason is that the Religion Clauses16—the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause—purport to give special 
treatment to religion. The Free Exercise Clause, at least as some have 
interpreted it, gives special protection to religion by requiring exemptions 
from otherwise neutral and generally applicable laws. And the Establishment 
Clause imposes special disabilities by prohibiting government support for 
religion, whether that support is symbolic or financial.17 
Professor Fish says that treating religion as special, in either of these 
ways, contradicts the core liberal idea of viewpoint neutrality, which is that 
the government has no business favoring or disfavoring speech based on its 
content.18 More fundamentally, he argues that the Religion Clauses represent 
the intrusion of a religious or theological perspective into a constitutional 
structure that is, in fundamental respects, incompatible with the claims of 
religious believers.19 From a religious perspective, duties to God are 
categorical and transcendent. No conflicting duty or claim can override or 
outweigh them. But no system of law can give religious believers unfettered 
liberty to act according to their convictions. As Justice Scalia said 
in Employment Division v. Smith (the peyote case)20 and as Chief Justice 
Waite said in Reynolds v. United States (the Mormon polygamy case)21 a 
century earlier, the result would be anarchy.22 There is a clash of religious 
versus secular values, and there is no way to resolve this tension. The two 
perspectives are incommensurable.23 Any attempt to adjudicate between 
them is either dishonest, purporting to provide a principle where there is 
none, or it is political, in the sense of one side imposing its values on the 
other. Professor Fish claims the latter is better. It’s all politics, all the way 
down.24 
 
16 Professor Fish refers to one “Religion Clause,” but I follow the conventional practice of 
referring to two such clauses, as described above.  
17 See Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1355–56 
(2012). 
18 See FISH, supra note 11, at 118.   
19 Id. at 146–50.  
20 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (“Any society adopting such a system would be 
courting anarchy . . . .”). 
21 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879) (“To permit this would be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen 
to become a law unto himself.”). 
22 See FISH, supra note 11, at 134.   
23 Id. at 146–47.  
24 Id. at 197–98.  
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I have never been persuaded by Professor Fish’s claim, and I am still 
not after reading The First. In my view, there is no choice but to engage in 
some sort of balancing between the claims of religious believers and the 
claims of others to equal liberty. Here I side with Cecile Laborde, Nelson 
Tebbe, and other liberals, who think that this approach is better justified by 
liberal values.25 Now Professor Fish says—aha!—in making this move, you 
are taking sides, you are adopting one set of values over another, you are, in 
effect, choosing one religious view over another. To which, I have always 
thought the correct reply was: of course liberals have values.26 No one ever 
claimed (or, at least, no one should have claimed) to be neutral across all 
values. But having a commitment to certain moral values doesn’t make one 
religious, unless you are prepared to flatten the concepts of religion, morality, 
politics—all domains of normativity—into a basic category of value and then 
say that anyone who affirms a value is, to that extent, religious. If that’s your 
definition of religion, then I suppose liberals are religious, but none the worse 
for it.  
At this point, we might ask: what’s wrong with flattening concepts in 
this way? One problem is that you are likely to miss some important features 
of the legal and political landscape. For example, to return to the theme of 
religion’s specialness, you could read the discussion of religious freedom in 
The First without realizing that there has been a sea change in First 
Amendment doctrine over the last two decades. In the 1990s, one plausibly 
could have interpreted the Supreme Court as holding that religion wasn’t 
special for purposes of receiving exemptions from generally applicable laws, 
but that it was special in the sense that the state could not promote religion. 
Now the Court seems close to having reversed itself on both of those views.27 
After the Court’s decisions in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
 
25 See generally LABORDE, supra note 15; NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN 
EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
26 See Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1066 (“Every conception of liberalism contains 
normative commitments, both moral and epistemic values that are central to the theory and practice of 
liberal politics. There is no internal contradiction in recognizing those values and in defending them, as 
well as the institutions built upon them, from those who would tear them down.”). 
27 See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Inversion and the 
Bladensburg Cross Case, in ACS SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2018−19 21, 24–28 (Steven D. Schwinn ed., 
2019) (discussing doctrinal inversions in the context of government religious speech, state funding of 
religion, and religious exemptions) [hereinafter Schragger & Schwartzman, Establishment Clause 
Inversion].  
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v. EEOC,28 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,29 and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission,30 religion might be seen as special in 
terms of receiving legal exemptions or at least special concern from courts 
reviewing government regulations.31 But following the holdings in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway,32 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. 
Comer,33 and American Legion v. American Humanist Association,34 the 
Court has basically gutted the Establishment Clause.35 The First Amendment 
now imposes few, if any, special disabilities on state support for religion. 
Does the state want to provide direct subsidies to a church? Five justices, and 
maybe more,36 seem to have no problem with that.37 Does the state want to 
sponsor the central symbol of Christianity? At least under some 
circumstances, seven justices are fine with that.38  
Under the old regime, religion wasn’t special for purposes of getting 
exemptions, but it was special for purposes of being denied state support. 
 
28 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) 
(recognizing a “ministerial exception” from antidiscrimination laws as grounded in the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment).  
29 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (granting an exemption 
under RFRA to a for-profit company that objected to paying for contraception under the Affordable Care 
Act).  
30 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (holding that 
Colorado violated the First Amendment by demonstrating hostility toward a wedding vendor who refused 
to comply with the state’s public accommodation law).  
31 Technically, the Christian baker in Masterpiece did not receive a religious exemption. The Court 
held that the state had violated the baker’s right to free exercise by applying its public accommodation 
law in a manner that displayed religious hostility. See id. at 1731 (“The Commission’s treatment of 
Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on 
hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”). But the Court’s distortion of the animus doctrine to reach 
that conclusion suggests special solicitude for religious views. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah 
Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 166 (2018). 
32 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585 (2014) (rejecting an Establishment Clause 
challenge to legislative prayer at the municipal level).  
33 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.  v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 (2017) 
(holding that a state could not exclude religious organizations from public funding of a playground 
resurfacing program).  
34 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019) (rejecting an Establishment 
Clause challenge to state ownership and display of a 40-foot tall Latin cross).  
35 See Schragger & Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Inversion, supra note 27, at 29 (“The 
entire edifice of the Establishment Clause has been collapsing, with the result that principles of 
disestablishment are becoming increasingly irrelevant.”). 
36 See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022. 
37 See id. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
38 See generally Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Establishment Clause Appeasement, 2019 
SUP. CT. REV. 271 (2019) (discussing the Court’s lopsided, seven-to-two, voting pattern in its decision to 
affirm the constitutionality of the Bladensburg Cross in American Legion).  
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Under the new regime, religion is special for purposes of receiving 
exemptions, but not for purposes of receiving state support.39  
At this point, you might want to throw up your hands and say, as 
Professor Fish is inclined to do, “What a mess! This is just more evidence 
that the pendulum swings back and forth, and that liberalism is incoherent 
and unstable, shifting with the politics of the times.” Maybe so,40 but 
observing the conceptual indeterminacy of the First Amendment doesn’t help 
us to understand the content or structure of the doctrine, which may shape the 
relationship between church and state for decades. We need more specificity 
about the moral values—or, as Professor Fish might say, the politics—that 
drive these changes. We need to know why it matters that religion is treated 
as special for some purposes, but not for others. Only then can we start to 
form some judgments about whether the Court’s conclusions make any 
sense.  
III.  NORMATIVE RETICENCE (OR NONCHALANCE?) 
At the end of his discussion of the Religion Clauses, having argued that 
they are a “contradiction within an anomaly,”41 Professor Fish finally 
addresses where he stands on substantive questions of religious freedom 
raised under the First Amendment. On matters of both free exercise and 
disestablishment, he says he “could go either way.”42 More specifically, he 
tells us: “I’m fine with allowing religious monuments in public spaces. I’m 
fine with insisting that the public sphere be religion-free. I’m fine with letting 
a few bakers refuse to create cakes for same-sex weddings. I’m fine enforcing 
antidiscrimination laws strictly and forcing the bakers to comply.”43 
I have long wondered about (and occasionally tried to test) Professor 
Fish’s normative reticence on these issues. Or perhaps reticence isn’t the right 
word—maybe detachment or nonchalance? He doesn’t seem to care very 
much one way or another. And that is not because Professor Fish is generally 
nonchalant about substantive issues. Consider, for comparison, his discussion 
of a recent controversy involving Professor Amy Wax, who made various 
provocative statements that were later criticized by the dean of her law 
school, Theodore Ruger.44 According to Professor Fish, Dean Ruger was 
 
39 See Schragger & Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the First Amendment, supra note 
4, at 1383–92 (discussing the Court’s double standard in its treatment of religion’s specialness).  
40 See id. (“But that discourse [of liberal principles] is clearly under strain, creating inconsistencies 
that suggest a larger cultural or attitudinal shift rather than a principled application of settled principles.”). 
41 FISH, supra note 11, at 150.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 150–51.  
44 Id. at 87–94.  
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clearly wrong when he condemned Professor Wax’s statements.45 There are 
some lines that a dean should not cross, and Professor Fish tells us exactly 
what he thinks about that issue and why.46 But when it comes to matters of 
religious freedom, he is harder to pin down. I have been trying, informally, 
to do this for several years now. So here goes again. Professor Fish says, “I’m 
fine with letting a few bakers refuse to create cakes for same-sex 
weddings.”47 Notice the sly quantifier—a few. What if it’s all the bakers? 
What if granting religious exemptions has the effect of entirely excluding 
LGBT people from the market? That’s one example. Another is raised by the 
case of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, in which the Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected a First Amendment challenge by a restaurant owner, 
who objected on religious grounds to serving African Americans.48 Would 
Professor Fish be willing to go either way on Piggie Park? Does his 
indifference to outcomes extend to that case as well? One more example: 
in Hobby Lobby, the Court granted a religious exemption to a large for-profit 
company that objected to paying for contraception.49 What if it turns out that, 
as a result, all the women who work for that company will be denied 
contraceptive coverage? Now maybe Professor Fish is indifferent in this case, 
too. But if so, his nonchalance starts to look more like callousness because 
this exemption will have quite serious consequences for the lives of tens of 
thousands of people.50 It seems morally unserious to say: “I could go either 
way. I don’t really care about what happens in this case.”   
It is one thing to say that there is no principled way to adjudicate Piggie 
Park or Hobby Lobby, whereby what Professor Fish means by “principled” 
is that both sides will agree with the reason for the decision. But it’s another 
to say that either outcome is fine. At some point, we have practical decisions 
to make, and then we have to plunk down on one side or the other. And we 
should have something to say about why it is we favor one over the other, 
even if our reasons are, in Professor Fish’s sense, political.  
 
45 Id. at 90 (“Ruger was doubly wrong . . . because he forgot entirely what his job was: not to judge 
faculty sentiments but to protect them.”). 
46 Id. at 90–94. 
47 Id. at 150.  
48 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam). 
49 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014).  
50 See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Compelling Interests and Contraception, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 1025, 1039–41 (2015) (surveying reasons why access to contraception is important for liberty, 
equality, and bodily integrity); Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 
22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 336 (2014) (discussing lack of access to contraception and 
resulting “adverse health consequences for both women and their children”).  
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IV.  ANSWERING THE QUESTION 
The First is a book of relentless questioning and criticism. Professor 
Fish has a fresh and seemingly endless supply of popular examples, but those 
acquainted with his earlier work may find his arguments, and his broader 
themes, familiar. And, given our current social and political circumstances, 
some readers may wonder, as I do: Why is Stanley Fish still picking on 
liberalism? My answer is that, despite all his objections, debunkings, 
unmaskings, provocations, and protestations, Professor Fish is a liberal. No 
one who really rejected liberalism would spend so much time, so much 
energy, so much thinking—what Professor Fish calls in the final words of his 
book “incessant labors”51—no one who was fundamentally illiberal would 
devote the better part of a life to showing us how to live honestly and candidly 
with the endless frustrations of a world that is still—despite the fervent 
wishes of so many antiliberal critics today—shaped by liberal institutions. 
And, unlike many of those critics, in all his work on law, politics, and 
philosophy, Professor Fish shows no interest in living in any other world. I 
might be reaching too far here, but he picks on liberalism, works on it, 
incessantly labors over it, because no other view is worthy of his critical 
powers and, I am tempted to say, his affections.   
 
 
51 FISH, supra note 11, at 198. 
